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DISCOVERY-ACCESS TO IMPEACHING EVIDENCE
Goldberg v. United States, 425 U.S. 94 (1976)
The Supreme Court in Goldberg v. United States'
held that a statement taken or recorded from a
government witness by a government lawyer that
falls within the Jencks Act 2 definition of "state-
ment" a must be produced for the defendant under the
conditions specified in the Jencks Act: the govern-
ment lawyer cannot refuse to produce the statement
on the ground that it constitutes a part of his "work
product." 4 In addition, the Court reiterated the
proper roles of the trial court and appellate court in
reviewing Jencks Act questions.
Petitioner Philip Goldberg and four co-defendants
were charged in a multiple-count indictment with
1425 U.S. 94 (1976).2 The Jencks Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (1970) provides in
pertinent part:
Demands for production of statements and reports
of witnesses.
(a)In any criminal prosecution brought by the
United States, no statement or report in the possession
of the United States which was made by a Govern-
ment witness or prospective Government witness
(other than the defendant) shall be the subject of
subpena, discovery, or inspection until said witness
has testified on direct examination in the trial of the
case .....
(e) The term "statement," as used in subsections
(b), (c), and (d) of this section in relation to any wit-
ness called by the United States, means-
(1) a written statement made by said'witness
and signed or otherwise adopted or approved by
him;
(2) a stenographic, mechanical, electrical, or
other recording, or a transcription thereof, which is
a substantially verbatim recital of an oral statement
made by said witness and recorded contempora-
neously with the making of such oral statement; or
(3) a statement, however taken or recorded, or a
transcription thereof, if any, made by said witness
to a grand jury.
318 U.S.C. § 3500 (e).
'Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947), is generally
considered to have established the attorney's "work prod-
uct" doctrine. For a more recent illustration of the Court's
handling of this doctrine see United States v. Nobles, 422
U.S. 225 (1975). In Hickman the Supreme Court held that
while private memoranda, written statements of witnesses
and mental impressions prepared by an attorney for use in
his clients' behalf fall outside the scope of attorney-client
privilege, they are protected as the "work product" of the
attorney, and thus are granted a qualified immunity from
discovery under federal rules.
using the mails to perpetrate a fraudulent scheme in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1341.5 Edwin Newman, one
of the co-defendants, agreed to plead guilty to a single
count of the indictment and to testify as a government
witness at Goldberg's trial. "
During the course of Goldberg's trial, Newman
appeared as the key witness for the prosecution. He
revealed in great detail the operation of the fraudu-
lent scheme and the transactions alleged in the
indictment. Upon cross-examination, Newman indi-
cated that on a number of occasions he had been
interviewed by government attorneys who took hand-
written notes relating to his forthcoming trial testi-
mony. Newman also testified that intermittently
throughout the interviews he would verify or correct
the accuracy of the lawyers' notes. ' Since no court
'This provision is as follows:
Frauds and swindles
Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any
scheme or artifice to defraud, or for obtaining money
or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses,
representations, or promises, or to sell, dispose of,
loan, exchange, alter, give away, distribute, supply, or
furnish or procure for unlawful use any counterfeit or
spurious coin, obligation, security, or other article, or
anything represented to be or intimated or held out to
be such counterfeit or spurious article, for the purpose
of executing such scheme or artifice or attempting so
to do, places in any post office or authorized deposi-
tory for mail matter, any matter or thing whatever to
be sent or delivered by the PostalService, or takes or
receives therefrom, any such matter or thing, or
knowingly causes to be delivered by mail according to
the direction thereon, or at the place at which it is
directed to be delivered by the person to whom it is
addressed, any such matter or thing, shall be fined not
more than $1,000 or imprisoned not more than five
years, or both.
18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1970).
'Subsequent to this agreement Newman's case was
severed from petitioner's. The three other co-defendants
entered guilty pleas.
?425 U.S. at 100-01.
"Q. As you were explaining-or discussing your testi-
mony, did anyone take notes?
"A. The two gentlemen took notes.
-Q. Were they occasionally read back to you to see
whether or not they correctly understood what you were
saying?
"A. Probably from time to time.
"Q. All right, sir. Did you either correct them or say 'Yes,
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reporter was present at any of the meetings at issue, 8
the lawyers' notes provided the only record of the
interviews.
Goldberg sought production of these aforemen-
tioned notes pursuant to theJencks Act. 'TheJencks
Act provides for the production in a federal criminal
prosecution of statements or reports of a government
witness who has testified on direct examination,
where such papers are encompassed within the
statutory definition of producible "statement" and
relate to the subject matter of the witness' testimony.
The Jencks Act defines a "statement" as:
(1) a written statement made by said witness and
signed or otherwise adopted or approved by him;
(2) a stenographic, mechanical, electrical, or other
recording, or a transcription thereof, which is a sub-
stantially verbatim recital of an oral statement made
by said witness and recorded contemporaneously with
the making of such oral statement.
(3) a statement, however taken or recorded, or a
transcription thereof, if any, made by said witness to a
grand jury. IC
The trial judge denied petitioner's motion for
production and a subsequent motion for in camera
inspection of the notes on the ground that the
materials constituted the "work product" of the
attorneys.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit," affirmed the ruling of the trial court, but on
a different ground. The appeals court did not
consider the "work product" question, but instead
held that the notes were not "statements" of the
witness within the meaning of the Jencks Act. The
Supreme Court granted certiorari in order to clarify
the construction and administration of the Jencks
Act. 12
that's right,' or 'No, that's not right because it went this
way, I believe,' words to that effect?
"A. Yes, that would happen."
Newman described this as the pattern followed at all
meetings in question.
8A court reporter who had been present on at least one
prior occasion was not there for any of the meetings at issue.
'18 U.S.C. § 3500 (1970). The text of the Act is given in
note 3 supra.
1018 U.S.C. § 3500 (e).
"This was an unpublished memorandum opinion.
12422 U.S. 1006 (1975). The grant of certiorari was
limited to the following question: "Whether 18 U.S.C. §
3500, theJencks Act, contains an 'attorney's work product
exception'; and whether a Government attorney's notes of
conversations with the key Government witness, to whom
the prosecutors read back their notes from time to time
where the witness corrected same, which notes were
The Court"5 first addressed the "work product"
issue considered by the district court. The govern-
ment, by use of a variety of arguments, had at-
tempted to persuade the Court that the work product
of an attorney, protected by the Court since the
landmark case of Hickman v. Taylor, 14 would be
threatened if statements made to a government attor-
ney and written down by the attorney were subject to
production under the Jencks Act. Initially, the gov-
ernment argued that such statements were not even
covered by the Act. It pointed out that the original
language of the Jencks Act only dealt with statements
made "to an agent of the government," "and it as-
serted that government attorneys are not to be con-
sidered as "agents of the government" for the pur-
poses of the Jencks Act. The Court disagreed and
held that a government lawyer would be considered
an "agent of the government." It rejected the govern-
ment's legislative history argument, pointing out that
the phrase "to an agent of the government" was
deleted from section (a) of the Jencks Act in 1970,
and that therefore all statements which fulfill the re-
quirements of the Jencks Act are producible, regard-
less of to whom the statements are made.
The government also suggested that in passing the
Jencks Act, Congress intended to limit the scope of
the Supreme Court decision in Jencks v. United
States. " In Jencks, statements made to an F.B.I.
agent by two prosecution witnesses were required to
be produced for the benefit of the defense.' 7 The pub-
prepared 'only after lengthy conversations had occurred and
a mutual understanding of the factual situation' had been
reached, if not compellable under the Jencks Act, are
compellable under the doctrine of Brady v. Maryland."
"Justices Stewart, White, Marshall, Blackmun, Rehn-
quist and Stevens joined Justice Brennan. Justice Stevens
filed a concurring opinion, in which Stewart, J., joined.
Justice Powell filed an opinion concurring in the judgment,
in which Burger, C. J., joined.
"329 U.S. 495 (1947). Generally, the "work product"
rule of Hickman grants protection to material prepared by
an attorney in contemplation of trial. In most jurisdictions
this protection is regarded as qualified rather than absolute,
so that "work product" is discoverable upon proper
showing, usually something in the nature of exceptionally
good cause. One could interpret the holding of the Court in
Goldberg as an indication that the purposes of the Jencks
Act provide sufficient good cause to overcome the qualified
privilege of "work product." The Court, however, did
not use this line of reasoning.
"This phrase was deleted in 1970 in order to add grand
jury statements to the statutory definition of statement.
425 U.S. at 102 n.6 (1976).
16353 U.S. 657 (1957).
"In this case two key prosecution witnesses had given
pretrial statements to the F.B.I. regarding a labor union
19761
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lic reaction to this decision was enormous, and was
apparently sparked by Justice Clark's dissenting
opinion in Jencks. 28 In his opinion Justice Clark
expressed the fear that the decision would cause a
"Roman holiday for rummaging through confiden-
tial information" in the government's possession. "
Public clamor and congressional concern resulted in
the passage of the Jencks Act. "
The government in the instant case contended that
to read the Jencks Act as allowing production of
statements made to government lawyers rather than
to investigative agents would serve as an expansion of
the Court's decision in Jencks and would thus be
contrary to congressional intent. The Court disa-
greed with the government's view of congressional
intent. According to the Court the legislative history
of the Jencks Act makes clear that the Act actually
reaffirmed the Court's holding in Jencks. "' The Act
was not intended to limit the Jencks decision, but was
instead concerned with clearing up misunderstand-
ings in lower courts as to the application of the
decision.
The government also urged its "limiting" con-
struction of the Act, asserting that a different
interpretation would allow defense counsel unfairly
to impeach a witness by the use of a statement subject
official's alleged communist activities. The defense re-
quested production of their statements for impeachment
purposes during the cross examination of the witnesses. The
Supreme Court held that the defense was entitled to these
statements. The defendant was not required to show any
inconsistency with the testimony, and the reports were to be
produced without regard to their admissibility into evi-
dence.
18353 U.S. 657, 681-82 (1957) (Clark, J., dissenting).
9One indication of the impact of Justice Clark's dissent
is that at one point during the Congressional debate, the
House Committee stated its goal as being to prevent
defendants from "rummagling] through confidential infor-
mation containing matters of public interest, safety, wel-
fare, and national security." H.R. Rep. No. 700, 85th
Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1957). 425 U.S.'at 104.
"The question of Congressional intent regarding the
passage of the Jencks Act presents a difficult task due to
numerous and often contradictory statements made by
members of both houses of Congress during the debates and
committee hearings. For a discussion of the public reaction
and Congressional response to the Jencks decision, see
Note, The Jencks Legislation, 67 YALE L.J. 674 (1958).
"1In Campbell v. United States, 365 U.S. 85, 92 (1961)
(Campbell I), Justice Brennan first expressed his opinion
that the Jenqks Act reaffirmed the holding of the Court in
Jencks. This conclusion was based on the belief that the
proposition central to both the Jencks decision and the
Jencks Act is that a criminal defendant is entitled, for
impeachment purposes, to relevant and competent state-
ments of a government witness in the possession of the
government.
to the interpretation of the lawyer who had written
the statement down. In rejecting this argument the
Court noted that the Act includes a carefully phrased
definition of "statement" which serves to eliminate
any extraneous or prejudicial commentary by the
writer. 22 In addition, the Court pointed out that
section (c) of the Act provides a specific procedure for
excising any material that does not relate to the
subject matter of the witness' direct testimony or di-
rect examination." Thus if the trial court conscien-
tiously examines the writings to determine whether
production under the Jencks Act is called for, the
interpretations of the writer could easily be detected
and purged from the text.
The Court also stated that these same provisions of
the Jencks Act would protect the privacy of an
attorney's thought processes. Any writings expres-
sing the attorney's strategy, personal notes or other
private thoughts would not fit the Jencks Act
definition of "statement," and would be excised
under section (c) of the Act as not relevant to the
subject matter of the testimony of the witness.
The Court's analysis of the "work product" issue
concluded with a comparison between the instant
case and the opinion in Hickman v. Taylor 2 in
which the Court established the "work product"
doctrine. In Hickman the Court had viewed with
obvious trepidation the production of an attorney's
written account of a witness' remarks. The Court
feared that the witness' words would be distorted,
and that in order to explain what the witness said in
reality, the attorney would be forced to take the
stand, thus detracting from his role as an officer of
2218 U.S.C. § 3500 (e). See note 2 supra.
2218 U.S.C. § 3500 (c) states that upon delivery of the
statements to the court for in camera inspection, "the court
shall excise the portions of such statement which do not
relate to the subject matter of the testimony of the witness."
2-329 U.S. 495 (1947). This case involved a tort action
against a tug owner due to an accident that claimed the lives
of five of the nine crew members. Prior to the initiation of
legal action, an attorney for the tug owners interviewed the
survivors and took statements with an eye toward the
anticipated litigation. After suit was brought by representa-
tives of the deceased, plaintiff requested copies of all
statements made by the survivors to defendant's attorney.
The tug owners, through their attorney, declined to
summarize or set forth the content of any such statements
on the ground that this was a privileged matter and an
attempt to indirectly obtain counsel's files.
The Supreme Court held that private memoranda,
written statements of witnesses and mental impressions
prepared by an attorney for use in his clients behalf fall
outside the scope of attorney-client privilege. However, they
are protected from discovery as "work product" of the




the court. In addition, the Court found no legitimate
purpose for the production of the attorney's writings.
In the instant case the Court concluded that the
Jencks Act itself should allay the fears expressed in
Hickman. First, the Court noted that in Jencks Act
cases there is a congressionally recognized purpose
for the disclosure of a witness' statements to govern-
ment lawyers, that being "to further the fair and just
administration of criminal justice."25 Second, the
Court felt the risk of distortion is minimized by
safeguards which allow the court to review the
attorney's notes and excise irrelevant material. Fi-
nally, the Court saw no realistic risk of a government
attorney who questioned the witness being called to
testify himself about the witness' statements, since
the only producible statements are those which can
be fairly said to be the witness' own.
Having decided that the district court erred in
holding that production of writings otherwise pro-
ducible under the Jencks Act could be refused by use
of the work product doctrine, the majority went on to
find that the court of appeals erred in' holding that
the attorney's notes were not "statements" under the
Act. The appeals court should never have undertaken
the initial determination of whether the materials in
question constituted producible "statements." It
should have remanded the case to the district court
and ordered it to conduct an inquiry into whether the
prosecutor's notes constituted producible "state-
ments."
According to the Court, it is clearly the province of
the trial judge to conduct an inquiry into the
circumstances of the witness' interview and to make
an appropriate determination based on the facts at
the disposal of the court. Only then can the court
know whether the material presented meets the
requirements of the Jencks Act. Hence, the case was
remanded directly to the district court with orders to
hold a hearing to redetermine whether production of
statements was called for under the Act, and to
supplement the record with new findings. On the
basis of those findings the court was either to reaffirm
its denial of petitioner's motion and enter a new
final judgment of conviction, or if the court concluded
that any of the material should have been produced
and that the error was not harmless, to vacate the
conviction and accord petitioner a new trial.
Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Stewart, 26agreed
with the majority that the Jencks Act gave the
defendant the right to request production of the
25425 U.S. at 107.
2 1d. at 112.
witness' statements to the government attorney, but
he took more seriously the threat of trial counsel
being forced to testify. He was particularly concerned
about difficulties which might occur when statements
in the form of narratives or summaries written by an
interviewer are allowed to be produced. The most
serious problem would occur, according to Justice
Stevens, when a witness had approved some, but not
all, of what the attorney had said. Clearly, such notes
could not be read to the witness to determine which
portions were his own statements, for that would
destroy their usefulness as an impeachment tool.
Accordingly, Justice Stevens felt that there exists a
"real danger" that the testimony of the attorney may
be necessary to explain the contents of his notes. 21
To solve this problem and, more importantly, to
alleviate possible unfairness to the witness, Justice
Stevens felt strongly that "any determination that a
portion of the prosecutor's notes is producible must
be supported by'a finding of unambiguous and
specific approval of the witness." justice Stevens
wanted to make clear that more than relevance to the
testimony and approval by the witness is necesary to
make a writing a Jencks Act statement.
Justice Powell's concurring opinion, joined by
Chief Justice Burger, accepted the majority's treat-
ment of the "work product" issue. But Justice Powell
did not agree with the majority that Newman's
testimony required29 the trial judge to conduct a
collateral inquiry into producibility. He suggested
that the Act requires the defendant to meet an initial
burden of showing that a collateral inquiry is neces-
sary to protect his rights and that in this case the
defendant did not meet that burden.
According to Justice Powell, a simple indication of
general concurrence by the witness that the informa-
tion as recorded by the government attorney was
correct, as in the instant case, was. insufficient to
establish that there was more than a speculative
possibility that a statutory statement existed. The
defense attorney's questions to the government wit-
ness must focus on whether there was adoption or
approval of a specific statement by the witness.
Justice Powell did not feel a collateral inquiry should
be undertaken by the court.
Moreover, Justice Powell suggested that the wit-
ness should know that he is adopting the interview
"Id. at 115 &n.5.
2 It remains unclear, however, whether even this rigid
test would alleviate the need for testimony on the part of the
attorney who wrote the notes.
29Throughout Justice Powell's opinion he italicized the
word "required" for emphasis.
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notes as a formalized statement in order for the court
to classify them as a producible statement. Such
safeguards, in the words of Justice Powell, are
necessary "to assure fairness to witnesses and the
Government as well as to defendants."" 0 In the
instant case, he concurred in the majority opinion
only because, in view of the trial judge's mistaken
holding on "work product," Goldberg's counsel may
have refrained from asking additional questions
believing that he had already satisfied the burden of
showing the need for an inquiry.
The decision of the Court in Goldberg v. United
States breaks a rather lengthy silence by the Court on
the subject of the Jencks Act, since the leading cases
dealing with interpretations of the Act are all over a
dozen years old. " Yet, the majority decision in
Goldberg provides no variation from the guidelines
promulgated by these earlier decisions.
The decision to remand the case to the district
court is in line with the Court's consistent position
that the varied and complex factual issues involved in
a Jencks Act determination require that the burden
of fact finding be left to the trial court. In reaffirming
this position the Court relied on Campbell v. United
States (Campbell 1), 32 where the Court unanimously
concluded that the Jencks Act implied a duty by the
trial judge to secure relevant evidence and conduct an
inquiry into whether the material presented fits the
requirements of the Jencks Act. In Campbell v.
United States (Campbell II), 3 'the Court stated that
the issues that arise in Jencks Act cases are issues of
fact, "predominantly a task for a nisi prius, not an
appellate court."" Since the trial court in the
instant case had made no inquiry whatsoever into the
facts and circumstances surrounding the existence of
a potential statement, the Supreme Court, following
the guidelines of the Campbell cases35 predictably
remanded the case to the district court to conduct an
inquiry into whether the prosecutor's notes consti-
tuted producible "statements."
In resolving the work product question the Court
simply adopted the approach of all the courts of
10425 U.S. at 127.
31See Campbell v. United States, 373 U.S. 487 (1963)
(Campbell II); Campbell v. United States, 365 U.S. 85
(1961) (Campbell I); Palermo v. United States, 360 U.S.
343 (1959).
32365 U.S. 85 (1961).
33373 U.S. 487 (1963).
"Id. at 493.
3
1See also Palermo v. United States, 360 U.S. at 353,
which held that final decision as to production must rest
within the good sense and experience of the district judge
guided by the standards outlined by the Court.
appeal that have considered it3 " and reached the
same conclusion: a government lawyer cannot cir-
cumvent the requirements of theJencks Act by use of
a work product argument. In fact, in view of the
general approach taken by the circuit courts, it is
somewhat surprising that the government even at-
tempted to make the work product argument. It is
even more surprising in light of the Court's own
earlier emphasis that all statements which fit Jencks
Act requirements must be produced."
However, although the majority opinion follows
prior Jencks Act decisions closely, the two concur-
ring opinions in Goldberg arguably indicate that four
members of the Court-Justices Powell, Stevens,
Stewart and Chief Justice Burger-are taking a
somewhat stricter approach to the requirements of
the Jencks Act, perhaps placing more of a burden on
the defense initially to show that a producible state-
ment exists. For example, Justice Powell, joined by
Chief Justice Burger, would apparently attempt to
distinguish between issues raised at the collateral
hearing and those relating to whether a collateral
hearing need be held at all. The question of what
specific foundational requirements need be shown by
the defense in order to obtain a collateral hearing
had never before been presented to the Supreme
Court, and those few lower courts that addressed the
issue merely assumed that a prima facie showing that
producible statements existed was all that was
required. "Justice Powell places more emphasis on
an early determination that a "statement" exists,
than previous cases had indicated was necessary or
desirable. But, he does not seem to be suggesting that
the prima facie standard be eliminated and replaced
by a more restrictive standard such as proof by
clear and convincing evidence. Rather, he seems
merely to be indicating a desire to "tighten" the
requirements of the prima facie showing.
Justice Stevens' concurring opinion also suggested
a tightening of the requirements to be met before a
statement will be considered producible under the
"United States v. Smaldone, 484 F.2d 311, 317 (10th
Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 915 (1974); United States
v. Hilbrich, 341 F.2d 555, 557 (7th Cir.), cert denied, 381
U.S. 941 (1965); Saunders v. United States, 316 F.2d, 346,
350 (D.C. Cir. 1963); United States v. Aviles, 315 F.2d
186, 191 (2nd Cir. 1963).
37373 U.S. at 487 (Campbell II); 365 U.S. at 85 (Camp-
bell I); Palermo v. United States, 360 U.S. at 343.
3 Harney v. United States, 306 F.2d 523 (1st Cir.
1962); Ogden v. United States, 303 F.2d 724 (9th Cir.
1962); United States v. Annunziato, 293 F.2d 373 (2d
Cir.),.cert. denied, 368 U.S. 919 (1961).
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Jencks Act. Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Stew-
art, would require unambiguous proof that the
witness specifically and knowingly adopted the state-
ment, and his opinion directs the trial court to stress
or make a careful examination of this particular is-
sue. He does not, however, suggest that this factual
determination be taken out of the hands of the trial
court, and he clearly considers hi- opinion to be
consistent with that of the majority. "
Thus, while the concurring opinions evidence a
slight shift from the earlier approaches of the Court
in Jencks Act cases, they do not indicate any major
dissatisfaction with the way in which the Act is
currently administered by the courts.
In conclusion, the central issue in Goldberg. as in
all Jenccs Act cases, was the balancing of competing
interests protected by the statute:' "the interest of the
Government in safeguarding government papers
39425 U.S. at 116.
from disclosure, and the interest of the accused in
having the Government produce 'statements' which
the statute requires to be produced. 4In drafting the
Jencks Act, Congress itself dealt with this delicate
balance and set forth statutory guidelines to aid in
the determination of when disclosure of statements
would be necessary. The balance struck is inherent in
the language of the Act itself. In Goldberg, the
Court, re-emphasizing the action of Congress in
setting up this balance, held that a government
attorney cannot circumvent the requirements of the
Jencks Act by the use of a work product argument. In
addition, the Court reinforced the role of the trial
court as the proper forum for determining the factual
stituations that surround the production of a Jencks
Act statement. In so holding the case does not break
any new ground, but it serves as a clear reminder
that the Jencks Act retains its vitality.
40365 U.S. at 95 (Campbell I).
1976]
